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Abstract: We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to 
incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. 
As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students.  We find that 
CEOs are considerably more trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness than students – thus 
reaching substantially higher efficiency levels than students. Moreover, we find that, for 
CEOs as well as for students, incentives based on explicit threats to penalize shirking backfire 
by inducing less trustworthy behavior – giving rise to hidden costs of incentives. However, 
the availability of penalizing incentives also creates hidden returns: if a principal expresses 
trust by voluntarily refraining from implementing the punishment threat, the agent exhibits 
significantly more trustworthiness than if the punishment threat is not available. Thus trust 
seems to reinforce trustworthy behavior. Overall, trustworthiness is highest if the threat to 
punish is available but not used, while it is lowest if the threat to punish is used. 
Paradoxically, however, most CEOs and students use the punishment threat, although CEOs 
use it significantly less.  
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Trust and trustworthiness are ubiquitous in human life. Most economic transactions require 
trust and trustworthiness because it is rarely the case that all dimensions of a transaction can 
be contractually specified and enforced. Arrow (1972, p. 357) neatly expressed this idea three 
decades ago: “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust…. 
It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be 
explained by a lack of mutual confidence.”  
This paper examines experimentally how people provide and respond to incentives in 
situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. Our data set is unique in that our subject pool is 
comprised of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) as well as students. This provided us with the 
rare opportunity to examine trust and trustworthiness among CEOs under controlled 
conditions.1 Economic experiments are often criticized because they are typically based on 
observing the behavior of undergraduate students. This can be problematic because students’ 
behavior may not be representative of behavior in naturally occurring environments, where 
selection effects may have created distinct populations of economic decision-makers – e.g., 
CEOs may be characterized by particularly selfish preferences. This criticism may be quite 
relevant in the domain of trusting and trustworthy behavior because trustworthiness often 
requires behavior that is at odds with one’s own material self-interest. In this case we would 
expect to observe less trust and trustworthiness among CEOs in situations where 
trustworthiness requires non-selfish behavior. However, in sharp contrast to this conjecture, in 
our experiments CEOs exhibited much more trusting and trustworthy behavior than students 
and, as a consequence, they achieved substantially higher efficiency levels in their 
transactions.  
Moreover, our results indicate that among CEOs, as well as among students, there are 
hidden costs and hidden returns of incentives. These costs and returns are hidden in the sense 
that they escape our attention if our reasoning is based on the assumption that people are 
exclusively self-interested. We show that the use of the explicit threat to sanction shirking 
backfires by inducing less trustworthy behavior; accordingly, incentives that explicitly 
threaten to penalize shirking may involve hidden costs. In recent years several economists 
have focused attention on similar phenomena (e.g., Benabou and Tirole 2000; Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Kreps 1997). However, our results also indicate that the availability of 
the sanctioning threat can be quite productive – giving rise to hidden returns of incentives. If 
principals voluntarily refrain from using the punishment threat when it is available, agents 
                                                           
1 To our knowledge there is no other experimental study that uses CEOs as a subject pool. There is one study 
(Cooper, Kagel, Lo and Gu 1999) examining the ratchet effect with middle and upper level Chinese managers.  
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exhibit significantly more trustworthiness than if the punishment threat is not available. Thus, 
if agents face no punishment threat, the mere fact that the principal could have used the 
punishment option affects the agent’s trustworthiness in a positive manner. This finding 
suggests that the deliberate non-use of the threat is perceived as a particularly trusting act that 
is reciprocated with a particularly trustworthy act. Exhibiting trust, to some degree, seems to 
generate trustworthiness that rationalizes the initially exhibited trust. In other words, trust and 
trustworthiness reinforce each other.  
In view of this result one might expect that rational principals do in fact refrain from 
using the punishment option. It turns out, however, that only 40 percent of the CEOs and 20 
percent of the students do not use the threat when it is available. Since using the threat 
reduces principals’ earnings substantially, the frequent use of the punishment threat 
constitutes a puzzle that warrants further investigation.  
Our preferred interpretation of the hidden costs and returns of incentives is in terms of 
reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people respond to acts that are perceived as kind in a kind 
manner and to acts that are perceived as hostile in a hostile manner (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger 1999, Falk and Fischbacher 1999). It seems plausible that explicit threats to 
sanction shirking may be perceived as hostile per se and convey an element of distrust. 
Reciprocal agents will respond to this hostility with increased shirking. Moreover, refraining 
from the use of a saliently available explicit threat may be perceived as a particularly kind and 
trusting act, which could explain why the deliberate non-use of the threat led to less shirking 
compated to the exogenous absence of the incentive. Our interpretation implies that not all 
kinds of incentives involve hidden costs or returns because not all of the incentives will be 
perceived as hostile. Yet, our interpretation also means that the psychological message that is 
conveyed by incentives – whether they are perceived as kind or as hostile – has important 
behavioral effects.2  
We believe that our results are relevant beyond the context of our experiments. This is 
so because in our context social preferences like altruism, fairness or reciprocity are likely to 
be a major source of trusting and trustworthy behavior, and these motives have been shown to 
be relevant in many other strategic situations as well (for overviews see, e.g., Camerer 2002, 
Sobel 2002). Therefore, to the extent that our results arise from interactions between social 
                                                           
2 Evidence in Fehr and Gächter (2002) supports this view. They show that the positive and negative framing of 
an incentive has a strong impact on effort in situations requiring trustworthiness. If the incentive is framed as a 
pay cut in case of shirking, agents’ effort is much lower compared to an economically identical incentive that is 
framed as a bonus that is paid in addition to a (lower) base wage when the required performance threshold is 
met. 
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preferences and economic incentives, there is reason to believe that these interactions are also 
relevant in other strategic games.  
There is also field evidence indicating that our results may be relevant in the 
workplace. In his book on wage rigidity, Bewley (1999, p. 431) reports that managers are well 
aware of the fact that workers have many opportunities to take advantage of employers, which 
renders worker morale important. Good morale means that workers are trustworthy, i.e., they 
also perform well in situations where they could shirk without being detected. To achieve and 
sustain a trustworthy work force, punishment “should seldom be used to obtain cooperation.” 
Therefore, “good management practice uses punishment and dismissal largely to deter and 
weed out bad characters and incompetents and to protect the company from malefactors.”  
The same forces that explain our data patterns may also explain why so few marriages 
are accompanied by prenuptial agreements. It seems plausible that prenuptial agreements are 
likely to introduce distrust into a marriage because they require detailed discussions and 
specifications of what will happen in the case of a divorce. As a consequence they may do 
more harm than good. Moreover, it also seems likely that being trusted is, in itself, valuable 
for the trustee. Including contingencies about what will happen if one party fails to abide by 
the contract is likely to be taken as an indication of distrust and perhaps even hostility, which 
in turn may trigger what the prenuptial agreement attempted to avoid – a lack of mutual trust 
and cooperation.3 If it is true that explicit haggling and bargaining about the concrete terms of 
a marriage sows the seeds for malfunctioning, then the existence of marriage and divorce laws 
can be interpreted as a remedy for a market failure because these laws free the parties from 
the necessity to bargain ex ante about the terms of their marriage.  
In view of the potential relevance of our results for a wide variety of contexts, we 
believe that by taking into account the effects we have documented the economic theory of 
contracts and incentives will progress further.  This theory has progressed substantially during 
the last two decades, but there are still crucial gaps in our knowledge about the effects of 
contracts and incentives (for excellent reviews of the empirical evidence see Prendergast 1999 
and Chiappori and Salanie 2000). 
Recently, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 2000b) and Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) 
reported interesting evidence indicating counterproductive effects of incentives. Our study 
                                                           
3 Business relations also may not be immune to such effects. In a classic paper, Macaulay (1963) reports that 
“detailed negotiated contracts can get in the way of creating good exchange relationships between business 
units.” Likewise, Sitkin and Roth (1993, p. 376) assert that “legalistic remedies can erode the interpersonal 
foundations of a relationship they are intended to bolster because they replace reliance on an individual’s good 
will with objective, formal requirements.” 
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differs from these papers along several important dimensions. To our knowledge, our study is 
the first one documenting the hidden returns arising from the availability of incentives. We 
also believe that our study is unique in its examination of subject pool effects – we do not 
know of any other study that examines how CEOs use and respond to incentives under 
controlled conditions, and whether CEOs exhibit more or less trust and trustworthiness than 
the typical experimental subject pool – undergraduate students. Moreover, the mentioned 
authors do not study the relational aspect of incentives, i.e., the impact of the incentive that 
arises from the fact that the principal can threaten to punish or can forgo threatening to punish 
the agent when given the opportunity.4 In contrast, our study focuses on this aspect by 
implementing experimental treatments that vary the principal’s capability of imposing a 
punishment.5  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In Section I we describe our 
experimental design, our subject pool and the details of the experimental parameters and 
procedures. In Section II we report our results. Section III summarizes and concludes the 
paper.  
I. Experimental Design and Procedures 
To study the hidden costs and returns of incentives in situations requiring trust and 
trustworthiness we used two versions of a Trust game.6 In both versions a principal (actor 1) 
and an agent (actor 2) were anonymously paired and the identity of the transaction partner 
was never revealed to the subjects.7 Both the principal and the agent received an endowment 
of 10 experimental money units called “shanks.” At the end of the experiment the amount of 
shanks earned was exchanged into real money (US $) according to a publicly known 
exchange rate (this represented their payoff as there was no show-up fee). In the Trust 
treatment, the principal could transfer x ∈{0, 1, 2, …, 10} shanks to the agent. For every 
shank transferred the agent received three shanks. In addition, the principal had to announce a 
                                                           
4 In Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) the principal chooses whether to enter a contract or not to enter a contract. 
Then the agent has the choice to honor the contract or not to honor the contract – the experimenter exogenously 
determines the punishment technology. In Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 2000b) the agents also face incentives 
that are determined by the experimenters.  
5 Our study also differs substantially from the experiments conducted by social psychologists on the undermining 
of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic rewards. This literature started with Deci (1971), and has led to several meta-
studies (see, e.g. Cameron and Pierce 1994; Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999). Trust and trustworthiness plays no 
role in these experiments, whereas it is key in our context. Moreover, in these psychology experiments subjects 
always faced exogenous incentives (in the form of monetary rewards) set by the experimenter.  
6 There is now a large literature on so-called Trust and Gift Exchange games starting with Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe 1995, and Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993 (see Camerer 2002 and Sobel 2002 for reviews). These 
games are sequential social dilemma games in which trusting or trustworthy behavior enhances the total payoff 
of the parties involved, but in which individuals face monetary incentives inhibiting trust and trustworthiness.  
7 Our experimental procedures implemented a single blind design that ensures that subjects do not know each 
other’s identities and that the decisions made by a pair of actors are known only to the pair and the experimenter. 
  
5
“desired back-transfer” ! ∈{0, 1, 2, …, 3x} from the agent. When the principal had made his 
decision (x, !), the agent was informed about this two-tuple and then chose the actual level of 
the back-transfer y ∈{0, 1, 2, …, 3x}. The principal’s payoff in the Trust treatment was given 
by "p = 10 – x + y, whereas the agent’s payoff was defined as "a = 10 + 3x – y. Thus, the 
desired back-transfer ! was not payoff-relevant.  
In the other treatment, however, which we denote as the Trust with Punishment (TWP) 
treatment, the desired back-transfer was important. In TWP, the principal also had to make a 
decision about x ∈{0, 1, 2, …, 10} and ! ∈{0, 1, 2, …, 3x}. In addition to (x, !), he decided 
whether to impose a fixed fine of f = 4 that had to be paid by the agent if y < !. Thus, in TWP 
the principal could threaten to punish the agent in case of malfeasance. In the instructions we 
avoided value-laden terms, i.e., we did not use the word “punishment” or “fine.” Instead, we 
spoke of a “conditional payoff cut.”8  After the principal had made his decision, which was 
constrained to be either (x, !, f = 0) or (x, !, f = 4), the agent was informed about the decision 
and had to choose y. The principal’s payoff in TWP was given by "p = 10 – x + y irrespective 
of whether the agent was fined or not, i.e., the fine was not given to the principal. The agent’s 
payoff was given by "a = 10 + 3x – y – 4 if the principal imposed the fine and the agent chose 
y < !. If the principal did not impose the fine or if the agent chose y ≥ !, the agent did not have 
to pay a fine, i.e., he earned "a = 10 + 3x – y.  
If both the principal and agent are selfish, and if the principal anticipates the agent’s 
selfishness, the predictions for our two treatments are straightforward. In the Trust treatment 
the selfish agent chooses y = 0 irrespective of the transfer x. Hence, a rational and selfish 
principal chooses x = 0. There is no precise prediction about the desired back-transfer ! 
because ! does not affect the payoffs. In the TWP treatment there are subgame perfect 
equilibria in which the principal can induce a selfish agent to pay back y = 3 or y = 4 by 
imposing a fine. For instance, if the principal transfers x = 1, demands ! = 3 and imposes f = 
4, the agent’s best response is y = 3. In this case the principal earns "p = 10 – 1 + 3 = 12 
whereas the agent earns "a = 10 + 3 – 3 = 10. Likewise, if the principal transfers x = 2, 
demands ! = 4, and imposes f = 4, y = 4 is a best response. The principal then earns "p = 10 – 
2 + 4 = 12 and the agent also earns "a = 10 + 6 – 4 = 12. It is obvious that in TWP the 
principal can never enforce more than y = 4 by imposing the fine. Yet, by choosing f = 4 his 
enforcement power exceeds the case of f = 0. Thus, in TWP the principal will always use the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
At the end of the experiment subjects are privately paid what they earned during the experiment.  
8 The Appendix contains copies of the instructions. 
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fine, and this should yield a higher payoff than under the Trust treatment, and compared to f = 
0 in the TWP treatment. In addition, if the principal chooses f = 0 in the TWP treatment, the 
agent should respond in the same manner as in the Trust treatment where fines were excluded 
by design.  
The only difference between the Trust and the TWP condition is the availability of the 
fine. The back-transfers of the agents in the Trust treatment provide us with a baseline 
measure of trustworthiness. Positive back-transfers in the Trust treatment may be due to the 
agents’ preferences for inequity aversion, reciprocity or altruism.9 By comparing these back-
transfers with the back-transfers in TWP, we can study the effect of the availability and the 
actual use of the incentive on back-transfers. Likewise, by comparing principals’ transfers 
across Trust and TWP conditions, we can examine the effect of incentive use and incentive 
availability on the trusting behavior of the principals. The comparison between the Trust 
condition and those interactions in the TWP condition in which the principal chooses f = 0 is 
particularly interesting because in economic terms the situation faced by the agents is 
identical in these cases. However, from a psychological viewpoint it may make a difference 
whether the absence of a threat is exogenously determined or endogenously chosen by the 
principals because the deliberate non-use of a saliently available threat may be perceived by 
the agents as a particularly trusting act. Thus, by comparing back-transfers in the trust 
condition with back-transfers in the TWP-interactions with f = 0, we can study whether trust 
breeds trustworthiness.  
Since one important purpose of our project was to compare the principals’ use of the 
incentive and the agents’ response to the incentive across CEOs and students, both subject 
pools participated in the Trust and the TWP treatment. In the student treatments one shank 
was worth $0.20, and in the CEO treatments one shank was worth $2.00. The different 
exchange rates served the purpose to control for stake effects across subject pools. We 
hypothesized that because CEOs have a higher income than students they need to face higher 
stake levels to take the experiment seriously. Post-experiment interviews revealed that both 
students and CEOs took the experiment very seriously.10  
                                                           
9 There are now many papers that model these kinds of social preferences. On reciprocity see, e.g., Rabin (1993) 
or Falk and Fischbacher (1999), on inequity aversion see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000), and on altruism see Andreoni and Miller (2002).  
10 CEOs reported an annual income of $9,625, while students reported a household income of $3,500. In an 
experimental session, CEOs earned on average $65; students’ average earnings were approximately $5.65. A 
session lasted roughly 45-60 minutes. To put these earnings figures into perspective, note that our students could 
have earned about $2 per hour in a good alternative job, and a large cup of coffee costs about $0.25 on campus. 
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We recruited 126 subjects for our student treatments from the undergraduate student 
body at the University of Costa Rica. Each treatment was run in a large classroom on the 
campus of the University of Costa Rica. To ensure that decisions remained anonymous the 
subjects were seated far apart from each other. The CEO subject pool included 76 CEOs from 
the coffee beneficio (coffee mill) sector who were gathered at The Costa Rica Coffee 
Institute’s (ICAFE) annual conference in March 2001.11 The conference is funded by ICAFE 
and presents the CEOs with information related to the most recent technological advances in 
the coffee processing sector, regulations within Costa Rica as well as abroad, and general 
market conditions, amongst other agenda items. Each of the CEO treatments was run in a 
large room on-site at the institute. As in the case of the students, communication between the 
subjects was prohibited and the CEOs were seated such that no subject could observe another 
individual’s decision.  
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects signed a consent form in which they 
acknowledged their voluntary participation in the experiment and agreed to abide by the rules 
of the experiment. There were two types of sessions. In a Trust-TWP session, subjects had to 
participate first in the Trust treatment and then in the TWP treatment. To control for possible 
spillover effects across treatments within a session, we reversed the treatment ordering in the 
TWP-Trust sessions.12 Each subject participated in only one type of session, and within a 
session each subject had the same role in the Trust and the TWP treatment. In total we 
conducted two sessions with the CEOs (one Trust-TWP and one TWP-Trust session) and four 
sessions with the students (two Trust-TWP and two TWP-Trust sessions).  
A few noteworthy aspects of our experimental design merit further consideration.  
First, principals made their decisions on a decision sheet. When the principals had made their 
decisions the experimenters collected the decision sheets and gave them to (different) 
randomly selected agents. Then the agents made their decision on the decision sheet. Once all 
agents had made their decision the experimenters again collected all decision sheets and 
informed the principals about the decision of their agent. Second, the experimental 
instructions were first written in English and then translated into Spanish. This translation was 
                                                           
11 ICAFE was created in 1948, and is a semi-autonomous institution in charge of providing technical assistance, 
undertaking field research, supervising receipts and processing of coffee, and recording export contracts. 
12 During the first treatment the subjects did not know that there would be a second treatment in the session. 
After the first treatment was completed, subjects were informed that another experiment would take place. They 
were also informed that the second experiment was the final one, and that they would be matched with a new 
partner in this experiment.  
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performed by a Costa Rican expert. To control for translation biases, a different translator 
located in Arizona then translated the Spanish instructions back into English.  
 
II. Experimental Results 
This section presents our experimental results. Since we find that ordering effects are not 
important we pool the data in the empirical analyses below.13 Our first result relates to the 
comparison between the behavior of CEOs and students. A major criticism levied against 
experimental results concerns the fact that most economic experiments are conducted with 
students. This may be problematic for two reasons. First, students may not be a representative 
subject pool for the overall population. Second, due to selection effects, particular people, 
who do not behave like students, may be overrepresented in certain sectors of the economy. 
Both reasons may constitute obstacles for generalizing the results gained from student 
experiments to other environments. Our first result addresses this issue.  
 
Result 1: CEO-principals transfer more money than students. Moreover, for any given 
transfer level, CEO agents pay back more money than students.  
 
R1 can be taken as an indication that CEOs are more trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness 
than students. They display a higher degree of trusting behavior because they make 
themselves more vulnerable to exploitation by transferring more money, and they exhibit 
more trustworthiness because, for identical transfer levels, they send back more money than 
students. Support for R1 can be found in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1 and 2 (all numbers in 
tables and figures are in shanks). Table 1 presents the average behavior of students and CEOs 
in both treatment types. In Table 1, bold-faced numbers indicate the average results for the 
CEOs, whereas the student results are in plain font. The first line in Table 1 shows that, both 
in the Trust as well as in the TWP-condition, CEOs transfer, on average, more money to the 
agents than do students. This difference in transfers (investments) is significant at the p < .01 
level in both treatments according to a two-sided Mann-Whitney test (z = 3.76 in the Trust 
and z = 3.67 in the TWP-condition).14  
The second line in Table 1 shows that in both conditions the CEOs’ desired back-
transfer is roughly 66 percent of the tripled investment. This means that on average CEO-
principals proposed to divide the total amount of money that was made available through their 
                                                           
13 In addition, we explicitly control for ordering effects in our regressions below (see footnote 15). 
14 All test results reported in the paper use two-sided alternatives.     
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transfers such that the payoff to the principal and the agent became equal. Table 1 also shows 
that the students’ desired back-transfer is slightly higher in both treatments. This difference is, 
however, not significant according to a Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.38 in the Trust condition 
and p = 0.45 in the TWP-condition). The third line in Table 1 indicates that in both conditions 
the agents’ payback, measured as a percentage of the tripled investment, is higher for CEOs. 
Note that by measuring the payback as a percentage of the tripled investment we are explicitly 
controlling for the investment level. While the CEOs pay back roughly 44 percent of the 
tripled investment in both conditions, the students’ payback varies between 32 and 39 percent. 
Further support for differences in trustworthiness can be gained from Figures 1 and 2. The 
figures compare the payback of the students with the payback of the CEOs at various 
investment levels. Figure 1, which is based on data gathered in the Trust condition, shows that 
CEOs pay back considerably more than students at each investment interval.15 Figure 2, 
which is based on data from the TWP-condition, also indicates that CEOs are more 
trustworthy at every given investment interval.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 here 
 
To examine whether these differences in trustworthiness across subject pools are statistically 
significant, we estimate OLS and random effects regression models for the students and the 
CEOs. The dependent variable in the regressions is the payback of the agent, which is 
regressed on the principals’ transfer to the agents and two dichotomous regressors. Formally, 
our regression models are given by  
 
yit = β# + β2xit + β3(TWP) + β4(TWP)(TWPN) + ωit (1) 
 
In equation (1), yit represents agent i’s payback to the principal in period t, and xit denotes the 
principal’s transfer (investment) to agent i in period t.16 The dummy variable TWP equals 1 if 
the subject is in the TWP-condition, 0 otherwise. The dichotomous variable TWPN takes on 
the value of one if the subject is in the TWP-condition and does not use the punishment 
                                                           
15 We partitioned the data into intervals because at some investment levels there are only a few observations.  
16 In the random effects model ωit = ut + αi + eit; E[αi] = 0, E[ut] = 0, E[αi2] = σα2, E[ut2] = σu2, E[αiαj] = 0 for i ≠ 
j, E[utαz] = 0 for t ≠ z, and ut, αi, eit, are orthogonal for all i and t. αi are random effects which control for 
unobservable subject characteristics; ut is a time dummy that captures ordering effects; eit is the well-behaved 
error term. In the OLS regressions ωit = eit. 
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option, 0 otherwise. Thus, the coefficient β4 on the interaction term (TWP)(TWPN) measures 
the marginal effect of not using the punishment option when the option is available, while the 
coefficient β3 measures the effect, relative to the Trust condition, of being in treatment TWP 
and using the punishment option. Since there are typically quite substantial individual 
differences in data sets where social preferences play a role, and since our sequential design 
may have created dependencies between the Trust and the TWP-condition, the random effects 
model is the appropriate specification. Nevertheless, for completeness, and to give an 
indication of the robustness of our results, we also report empirical results from OLS 
regression models. 
Table 2 contains summary regression estimates. In each regression model, empirical 
estimates from both the student and CEO samples indicate that the coefficient on investment 
is positive and significant at the p < .01 level. Moreover, both for the OLS as well as for the 
random effects regression models, the coefficient in the CEOs’ specification is considerably 
larger. The null hypothesis that the investment coefficient for the CEOs is identical to the 
coefficient for the students can be rejected at the p < .05 level in each specification. Thus, 
taken together Figures 1 and 2 and our empirical estimates provide fairly strong evidence that 
the trustworthiness of CEOs exceeds the trustworthiness of students in these games.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
If subjects care only for their own material payoff, then the punishment option is a useful tool 
for principals to induce agents to transfer back some money. Thus, if the punishment option is 
available, the principal will always be better off in money terms if the option is used. Our next 
result shows, however, that in the presence of social preferences this argument may be 
seriously misleading.  
 
Result 2: If the punishment option is available, then agents pay back more money and 
principals earn more money if the option is not used.  
 
R2 suggests that the use of the punishment option generates costs that are overlooked if social 
preferences are neglected. Instead of increasing the amount transferred back, the punishment 
actually reduces the payback. A first indication in support of R2 is contained in Table 3, 
which separates the data in the TWP-condition according to whether the principals imposed 
the punishment. Bold-faced numbers in the third line of Table 3 indicate that refraining from 
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the use of the punishment option nearly doubles the payback of the CEOs as a percentage of 
the tripled investment. If the punishment option is used, then CEOs pay back 32.7 percent of 
the tripled investment, while if the option is not used they pay back 61.4 percent. For students, 
the increase in the payback is smaller but remains quite substantial. In addition, Figures 3 and 
4 show that, for any given investment interval, both CEOs and students pay back much more 
money if the punishment option is not utilized. To examine whether this increased payback 
also led to increased payoffs for the principals, we turn to the fourth line of Table 3, which 
reveals that both for CEO-principals and for student-principals the material payoff is higher if 
the punishment option is not used. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
Insert Figures 3 and 4 here 
  
To examine whether the increase in the payback that is associated with the non-use of 
the punishment option is significant, we performed several statistical tests.  A Mann-Whitney 
test indicates that the null hypothesis of equivalent paybacks (in percent of tripled 
investments) can be rejected at the p < .01 level for CEOs and the p < .07 level for students. 
Similarly, Mann-Whitney tests of the null hypotheses that the principals’ payoffs are not 
affected by the use of the punishment option can be rejected at the p < .01 level for both CEO 
and student samples. Furthermore, the regression coefficient of TWPN in Table 2 measures 
the increase in investment that is associated with the non-use of the punishment option. For 
the CEO data, regression estimates in Table 2 indicate that not using the punishment option 
increases the payback significantly – approximately by six units. In the student sample the 
increase is roughly four units. Both of these empirical estimates are significantly different 
from zero at the p < .05 level.   
R2 informs us about the hidden costs of incentives. These costs are hidden in the sense 
that they have generally been overlooked by standard contract theory because they are absent 
from models that are based on the self-interest assumption. Next we examine whether there 
exist hidden returns of incentives – returns that accrue from the availability of the incentive. 
We have already found that refraining from punishment, when the option is available, is 
associated with higher paybacks. This raises the question of whether the deliberate non-use of 
the punishment option is better than the non-availability of the punishment option. If it were 
true that one could increase one’s payback by deliberately not using the punishment option, 
we could speak of the hidden returns of incentives because these returns can accrue only if the 
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incentive is available. As before, these returns are hidden in the sense that standard contract 
theory has neglected such effects. Our next result characterizes these hidden returns to 
incentives.  
 
Result 3: If in the TWP-condition the available punishment option is not used, then the agents 
pay back more money, and the principals earn more money, than in the Trust 
condition where no punishment option is available.  
 
Support for R3 comes first from line 3 of Table 3, which suggests that both the students as 
well as the CEOs pay back more money if the punishment option is deliberately not used than 
when it is unavailable. For instance, for the CEOs (students) the actual payback is 44.1 
percent (31.6 percent) of the tripled investment in the Trust treatment, whereas in the TWP 
treatment the CEO-agents (student-agents) pay back 61.4 percent (52.9 percent) if there is no 
punishment threat. We find that, via a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for matched pairs, this 
difference is significant at the p < .02 (p < . 08) level for CEOs (students). Similar insights 
follow from inspection of Figures 3 and 4: not using the punishment option increases the 
agents’ payback at every investment interval relative to not having the option available. 
Moreover, Table 3 also indicates that CEO- and student-principals earn more money when 
they deliberately do not use the punishment option, a difference which is significant at the p < 
.01 level for CEOs, but only marginally significant in the student sample (p < .15).  
To examine whether these differences are statistically significant in our regression 
framework, we turn to the random effects results in Table 2. Note that the effect of the 
deliberate non-use of the punishment option, relative to the Trust condition, can be measured 
via the summation of coefficients β3 and β4 in our regression model. This follows because β3 
+ β4(TWPN) = β3 + β4 if the subject is in the TWP-condition and the principal did not use the 
punishment option (i.e., TWPN = 1). Table 2 reveals that for each regression model the sum 
β3 + β4 exceeds 4, suggesting that the deliberate non-use of the punishment option, relative to 
the Trust condition, has a positive effect. A joint test of statistical significance suggests that 
the null hypothesis β3 + β4 = 0 can be rejected at the p < .01 level for both the CEO and 
student sample. Taken together, our results therefore suggest that there are indeed significant 
hidden returns of incentives: it is advantageous to have the ability of signaling that you 
abstain from using the punishment option compared to not having the punishment option 
available.  
  
13
Thus far our results reveal that not using the punishment option dominates, in a 
material sense, both using the option and not having the option available. This raises the 
question of whether principals took advantage of this effect by not using the option. Our next 
result shows that this was not the case. 
 
Result 4: The majority of CEO- and student-principals use the punishment option in the 
TWP-condition. However, CEOs use the punishment option less often.  
 
In total, 79.4 percent of the student-principals (50 out of 63) chose the punishment option 
while only 60.5 percent of the CEO-principals (23 of the 38) chose the punishment option. 
This difference is significant at the p < .05 percent level (z = - 2.05) according to a Fisher 
Exact test.  
Why did the majority of student- and CEO-principals in the TWP-condition choose 
the punishment option although this caused a substantial reduction in their monetary payoff? 
One possibility is that the principals have social preferences that induce them to choose the 
punishment option. For example, if principals dislike being worse off than agents, they may 
want to correct the payoff inequality created by a shirking agent by choosing the punishment 
option. Thus, if principals are sufficiently inequality averse in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and if they anticipate a sufficiently high probability 
that the agent will shirk, they will use the punishment option.17 Likewise, if principals exhibit 
reciprocal preferences they prefer to punish hostile actions. In our context this means that 
reciprocal principals prefer to punish a shirking agent even if it is costly for themselves.18  
Another reason for the frequent use of the punishment option could be that the 
principals did not anticipate the negative effect on paybacks that is caused by using the 
option. There is some evidence (Heath 1999) indicating that people have an extrinsic 
incentive bias – people tend to believe that others are more motivated than themselves by 
extrinsic incentives. In our setting, an extrinsic incentive bias might have led the principals to 
favor the punishment option. Our data do not allow us to parse out the correct interpretation 
for the behavior of the principals. It is, however, possible to rule out rational inequality 
aversion as a reason for the principals’ behavior. Note that if inequality-averse principals are 
                                                           
17 The Fehr-Schmidt model of inequality aversion assumes that a substantial fraction of individuals care for their 
own material payoff and the absolute differences between their own payoff and the payoff of relevant reference 
actors. In our setting the agent clearly is a relevant reference actor for the principal. The Bolton-Ockenfels model 
assumes that a fraction of the subjects care about the payoff ratio.  
18 For models of reciprocity see, e.g. Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1999) or Falk and Fischbacher 
(1999).  
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rational they will impose the punishment only if they can rationally expect to correct the 
payoff inequality between principals and agents. Yet, Table 3 shows that by using the 
punishment option in the TWP-condition, the payoff advantage of the agents increases from 
3.9 to 10.6 for the CEOs. Thus, rational inequality-averse CEO-principals have even more 
reason not to use the punishment option compared to money-maximizing CEO-principals. In 
the case of students, Table 3 indicates that the use of the punishment option changes the 
payoff advantage of the agents, on average, from 6.7 to 6.3. A Mann-Whitney test indicates 
that this small difference is not significant (z = 0.80). Thus, rational inequality-averse student-
principals also have no reason to use the punishment option because this reduces their 
absolute payoff without changing the payoff differences. Therefore, only the negative 
reciprocity hypothesis and the extrinsic incentive bias hypothesis remain plausible candidates 
for explaining the principals’ behavior in the TWP-condition.  
In view of the possibility that the majority of principals might be prone to an extrinsic 
incentive bias, it is interesting to ask whether the use of the punishment option in the TWP-
condition decreases the payback compared to the Trust condition where the incentive was not 
available. In addition, it is interesting to know whether principals who use the punishment 
option gain in material terms if they are deprived of the punishment option. Our next result 
addresses this question.  
 
Result 5: CEO-agents pay back more money if the punishment option is not available than 
when it is available and used. Student-agents pay back the same amount of money 
irrespective of whether the option is not available or available and used. Neither 
CEO- nor student-principals who use the punishment option gain in material terms 
if they are deprived of the option.  
 
Support for R5 comes from Tables 2 and 3.  Table 3 shows that CEO-agents pay back 32.7 
percent of the tripled investment if they face a punishment threat while if this threat is not 
available they pay back 44.1 percent. Using a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, we find that this 
difference is statistically significant at conventional levels (p < .05). Our regression model 
also confirms this result. In Table 2, the coefficient for TWP measures the effect of being in 
the TWP-condition and using the punishment option relative to the Trust condition. The 
random effects specification for the CEOs suggests that the estimated coefficient is negative 
and significantly different from zero at the p < .05 level; a coefficient estimate of 1.55 implies 
that CEO-agents pay back roughly 1.5-1.6 units less in the TWP if they face a punishment 
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threat. To examine whether this led to a higher payoff for the CEO-principals, we applied a 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to the principals’ payoffs in row 4 of Table 3 and found that the 
null hypothesis of equal payoffs cannot be rejected at conventional levels (z = 1.16).  
Table 3 indicates that student-agents even decrease the payback from 34.9 percent of 
the tripled investment, if they face a punishment threat, to 31.6 percent of the tripled 
investment, if no threat is available. However, both a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test and the 
random effects regression model in Table 2 show that this payback change is not significant, 
and that the size of the TWP-coefficient is small. Likewise the null hypothesis of equal 
principal payoffs cannot be rejected according to a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. Thus, neither 
the CEO- nor the student-principals who use the punishment option would gain in material 
terms if they were deprived of the possibility to use the option.  
One of the outstanding features of our data is that both student- and CEO-agents pay 
back more money if the principals deliberately do not use the punishment threat (see Figures 3 
and 4). In our view the notion of reciprocity provides a natural interpretation of these data. 
Recall that reciprocity means that agents respond in a hostile manner to actions that reveal a 
hostile intention. In our treatments, the threat to punish agents may reveal hostile intentions 
for two reasons. First, the threat per se may be perceived as hostile. Second, agents may 
perceive the threat as an indication of distrust. To the extent to which trusting actions are 
perceived as kind and distrusting actions as hostile, an explicit punishment threat may be 
perceived as a hostile act. Whatever the reason for interpreting someone’s intention as hostile 
may be, if reciprocal agents perceive the explicit threat as a hostile act they are less willing to 
pay back money beyond the level that is dictated by pure self-interest. In this context we find 
one fact particularly interesting. Note that, irrespective of whether the punishment threat was 
used, CEO-principals desired to receive a back-transfer ! that, if ! was met, equalized payoffs 
of the principal and the agent (see bold-faced figures in line 2 of Table 3). Thus, the actions of 
the CEO-principals implied a desire for a fair payoff distribution both when they used and 
when they did not use the punishment option in the TWP. Nevertheless, when the punishment 
option was used the agents paid back only half as much (as a percentage of tripled 
investment). In our view this lends support to our interpretation in terms of the perceived 
hostility of the punishment threat because the different payback levels of the agents cannot be 
attributed to differences in the fairness of the intended payoff distribution.  
The previous argument interprets the difference in agent behavior within the TWP-
condition in terms of reciprocity. Further evidence for the reciprocity interpretation is 
provided by the difference in agents’ behavior between the TWP-condition, when punishment 
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is not used, and the Trust condition. In both situations principals do not use the punishment 
option. The only difference is that in the Trust condition they cannot use it while in the TWP-
condition they voluntarily do not use it. In our view it is quite plausible that the deliberate 
non-use of the punishment option is perceived as a particularly kind and trusting move. As a 
consequence, reciprocal agents have a particular reason to reward this move.   
Of course, it would be reassuring for our interpretation if the agents did not only 
perceive the non-use of the punishment threat as a particularly trusting act but if the principals 
in the TWP did in fact exhibit more trust when they refrained from using the threat. To 
examine this question we examine transfer levels in the TWP treatment and find the 
following.   
 
Result 6: Principals who do not punish in the TWP-condition transfer more money to the 
agents than both principals who punish, and principals who are deprived of the 
punishment option.   
 
Table 3 shows that CEO-principals in the TWP condition invested 6.5 units if they threatened 
to punish, while if they did not use the threat they invested 8.5 units. This difference is 
significant at the p < .02 level according to a Mann-Whitney test. The table also shows that 
student-principals increased their investment from 4.4 units when they used the punishment 
threat to 7.4 units when they did not, which is again significant at conventional levels (Mann-
Whitney test: p < .01). This indeed suggests that those principals who voluntarily refrained 
from the punishment threat exhibited more trust. Thus, in view of this finding, it also seems 
quite rational for the agents to interpret the absence of the punishment threat in the TWP-
condition as a particularly trusting act. It is also interesting that those principals who do not 
punish in the TWP condition also invest much more than the principals in the Trust condition. 
This effect is again significant for CEOs as well as for students (p < .03 for CEOs and p < .01 
for students according to a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for matched pairs). This suggests that 
these principals actually exhibit more trust if they can signal their good intentions. 
Finally, we consider efficiency consequences of the availability and the use of the 
punishment option. Efficiency is jointly determined by the actions of principals and agents. 
Principals’ transfers determine the total pie that is available for the two parties in the Trust 
condition and the TWP condition if the punishment is not chosen. If, in the TWP-condition, 
the punishment option has been chosen, paybacks of the agents determine whether the total 
available pie is reduced by actual punishments. 
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Result 7: CEOs consistently achieve higher efficiency levels. Across conditions, efficiency is 
highest when the punishment option is available and not used and lowest if the 
punishment option is used. Intermediate efficiency levels prevail if the punishment 
threat is not available.  
 
We measure efficiency as a percentage of the maximum surplus that could have been 
generated by the two parties. In all treatment conditions the maximum surplus is 40 shanks 
($80 for CEOs, $8 for students). In the Trust condition and the TWP-condition without a 
punishment threat, this level is achieved if the principal transfers his entire endowment to the 
agent. If, in the TWP-condition, the principal uses the punishment threat, an additional 
requirement for achieving the maximum surplus is that the agent pays back the desired 
amount of money. Support for R6 is provided in Table 4, which shows the efficiency levels 
that are reached by CEOs and students in the various conditions. The table shows that across 
all conditions the CEOs achieve between 5 and 12 percentage points higher efficiency levels 
than the students. The table also shows that – irrespective of whether we examine the CEO-
data or the student-data – efficiency is highest in the TWP-condition without punishment and 
lowest in the TWP-condition with punishment. Thus, consonant with the results highlighted 
above, viewed from the efficiency perspective it is good to have the incentive available but to 
refrain from using it.  
III. Concluding Remarks 
We examined how CEOs provide and respond to incentives in situations requiring trust and 
trustworthiness. Our data show that CEOs exhibit considerably more trustful and trustworthy 
behavior than students. As a consequence, CEOs reach substantially higher efficiency levels. 
These results indicate that non-pecuniary motives may play a more important role in 
transactions among CEOs than in transactions among students. The fact that CEOs use the 
punishment option less often suggests that CEOs better recognize the vital role that trust plays 
in eliciting trustworthy behavior. 
Behavior of both CEOs and students indicates that there are hidden costs and returns 
of explicit punishment threats. This result suggests that if we focus our attention exclusively 
on the self-interest motive when assessing the effects of incentives such effects will escape 
our attention. Both CEOs and students respond in a less trustworthy manner if they face an 
explicit punishment threat in case of shirking. However, while the use of the punishment 
threat causes hidden costs, the availability of the punishment threat causes hidden returns: if 
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principals voluntarily refrain from the threat to punish, then they induce more trustworthy 
behavior than in a situation in which no punishment threat is available. This indicates that 
trustworthiness is affected by not only the absence or presence of the punishment threat but 
also by the reason for the absence of the threat. It seems that voluntarily refraining from the 
threat to punish is perceived as a particularly trusting act, which is reciprocated with a 
particularly trustworthy act. Thus, in our context trust breeds trustworthiness.  
Taken together it turns out that trustworthiness and efficiency is highest if the explicit 
punishment threat is available but not used, while it is lowest if the explicit threat is used. 
Despite this finding, it is not wise to make the punishment threat unavailable because the 
availability of the threat enables principals to signal trust by deliberately not using the threat. 
However, the vast majority of students and a majority of CEOs forgo this opportunity of 
signaling trust, causing a substantial reduction in their material payoff. It is an interesting and 
important task for future research to examine the precise reasons behind this paradox.  
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 Appendix: Instructions for Trust-condition You are actor 1 
 
 
Description of your decision problem 
 
You are a participant in the following decision-making problem. You have been randomly matched with 
another participant in this problem who is in another room.  You will never be informed of the identity of 
this person, either during or after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be 
informed about your identity.  You are in the role of actor 1 and the matched participant is in the role of 
actor 2. You as well as actor 2 participate only once in this decision problem. You make your decisions 
with the help of the decision sheet that has been handed out together with this description. Here are the 
rules that you and actor 2 have to obey when you make your decisions: 
 
Endowment 
At the beginning both actors receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks.  
 
Your decision 
You have to make a decision that consists of two components:  
 
! A transfer between 0 and 10 shanks to actor 2.  
You can transfer any amount between 0 and 10 shanks to actor 2. You make this decision by 
indicating a number between 0 and 10 in the appropriate box on your decision sheet. We will then 
triple this transferred amount, i.e., actor 2 receives three times the amount of shanks you transferred. 
 
" A desired back-transfer from actor 2.  
After you have made your transfer to actor 2 you indicate a desired back-transfer on your decision 
sheet. The desired back-transfer is the amount you would like to receive back from actor 2. The 
desired back-transfer can be any number between 0 and three times the amount you have transferred.  
 
 
The decision of actor 2 
Once you have fixed both components of your decision, we collect your decision sheet and give it to actor 
2. In this way we inform actor 2 about your decisions. Then actor 2 can transfer any amount of the total 
number of shanks he received back to you. 
 
 
Payoffs  
 
You as actor 1 receive:   10  shanks  –  transfer to actor 2  +  back-transfer from actor 2. 
 
Actor 2 receives:  10 shanks  +  3 × transfer from actor 1  –  back-transfer to actor 1.  
 
 
Exchange rate:  For every shank you earn you will be paid $2 (2 U.S. dollars).
 Appendix: Instructions for Trust with Punishment condition You are actor 1 
 
PD2 
TD2 
 
Description of a  
 
New Decision Problem 
 
 
You will now participate in a new decision problem. As before you are randomly matched with another 
participant in another room. You are again in the role of actor 1. The other participant is in the role of actor 
2. Notice that in this new decision problem you are matched with a new person, i.e., actor 2 is now a 
different person compared to the previous problem.  Once again, you will never be informed of the identity 
of this person, either during or after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be 
informed about your identity.   
 
The new decision problem is – with one exemption – identical to the previous problem. The exemption 
concerns the conditional payoff cut. In the new problem you can impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 
shanks on actor 2. In every other respect the problem is the same. Thus both actors receive again an initial 
endowment of 10 shanks.  
 
 
Your decision 
Again you have to indicate on your decision sheet what amount you want to transfer to actor 2 and what 
your desired back-transfer is. Actor 2 receives three times the amount of shanks you transferred. 
 
In addition to the transfer and the desired back-transfer you also have to indicate on your decision sheet if 
you want to impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks on actor 2.  
• A conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks for actor 2 has the following consequences: The payoff of 
actor 2 will be reduced by 4 shanks if his actual back-transfer is less than your desired back-
transfer. The conditional payoff cut is not due, i.e., it does not reduce the income of actor 2, if 
actor 2 transfers exactly your desired amount or more to you.  
• If you do not impose a conditional payoff cut—the income of actor 2 will not be reduced, 
irrespective of how large the back-transfer of actor 2 is.  
 
 
The decision of actor 2 
Once you have fixed all three components of your decision, we collect your decision sheet and give it to 
actor 2. In this way we inform actor 2 about your decisions. Then actor 2 can transfer any amount of the 
total number of shanks he received back to you. In case that you have chosen a conditional payoff cut of 4 
shanks, and if actor 2 transfers back less than what you desired, the conditional cut is due.  
 
 
Payoffs  
 
You as actor 1 receive: 10  shanks  –  transfer to actor 2  +  back-transfer from actor 2. 
 
Actor 2 receives:  10 shanks  +  3 × transfer from actor 1  –  back-transfer to actor 1  –  4 shanks 
 (in case that a conditional payoff cut has been imposed and is due)  
 
 
Exchange rate:  For every shank you earn you will be paid $2 (2 U.S. dollars).
 Appendix: Instructions for Trust condition You are actor 2 
 
 
 
Description of your decision problem 
 
You are a participant in the following decision-making problem. You have been randomly matched with 
another participant in this problem who is in another room.  You will never be informed of the identity of 
this person, either during or after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be 
informed about your identity.  You are in the role of actor 2 and the matched participant is in the role of 
actor 1. You as well as actor 1 participate only once in this decision problem. You make your decisions 
with the help of a decision sheet that will be given to you after actor 1 has indicated his decision on this 
sheet. Here are the rules that you and actor 1 have to obey when you make your decisions:  
 
Endowment 
At the beginning both actors receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks.  
 
The decision of actor 1 
First actor 1 has to make a decision that consists of the following two components:  
 
! A transfer between 0 and 10 shanks to you.  
Actor 1 can transfer any amount between 0 and 10 shanks to you. Actor 1 makes this decision by 
indicating a number between 0 and 10 in the appropriate box on the decision sheet. We will then triple 
this transferred amount, i.e., you will receive three times the amount of shanks transferred by actor 1.  
 
" A desired back-transfer from you.  
After actor 1 made a transfer to you he indicated a desired back-transfer on the decision sheet. The 
desired back-transfer is the amount he would like to receive back from you. The desired back-transfer 
can be any number between 0 and three times the amount that actor 1 has transferred to you.  
 
 
Your decision  
Once actor 1 has fixed both components of the decision, we collect the decision sheet and give it to you. In 
this way we inform you about actor 1’s decisions. Then you can transfer any amount of the total number of 
shanks you received back to actor 1.  
 
Payoffs  
 
Actor 1 receives:  10  shanks  –  transfer to actor 2  +  back-transfer from actor 2. 
 
You as actor 2 receive:  10 shanks  +  3 × transfer from actor 1  –  back-transfer to actor 1.  
 
 
Exchange rate:  For every shank you earn you will be paid $2 (2 U.S. dollars).
 Appendix: Instructions for Trust with punishment condition You are actor 2 
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Description of a  
 
New Decision Problem 
 
 
You will now participate in a new decision problem. As before you are randomly matched with another 
participant in another room. You are again in the role of actor 2. The other participant is in the role of actor 
1. Notice that in this new decision problem you are matched with a new person, i.e., actor 1 is now a 
different person compared to the previous problem.  Once again, you will never be informed of the identity 
of this person, either during or after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be 
informed about your identity.   
 
The new decision problem is – with one exemption – identical to the previous problem. The exemption 
concerns the conditional payoff cut. In the new problem actor 1 can impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 
shanks on you. In every other respect the problem is the same. Thus both actors receive again an initial 
endowment of 10 shanks. 
 
 
The decision of actor 1 
Again actor 1 has to indicate on the decision sheet what amount he wants to transfer to you and what his 
desired back-transfer is. You receive three times the amount of shanks actor 1 transferred to you. 
 
In addition to the transfer and the desired back-transfer actor 1 also has to indicate on the decision sheet if he 
wants to impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks on you.  
• A conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks has the following consequences for you: Your payoff will be 
reduced by 4 shanks if your actual back-transfer is less than the back-transfer desired by actor 1. 
The conditional payoff cut is not due, i.e., it does not reduce your income, if you transfer exactly 
the desired amount or more to actor 1.  
• In case that actor 1 does not impose a conditional payoff cut—your income will not be reduced, 
irrespective of how large your back-transfer to actor 1 is.  
 
Your decision  
Once actor 1 has fixed all three components of the decision, we collect the decision sheet and give it to you. 
In this way we inform you about actor 1’s decisions. Then you can transfer any amount of the total number 
of shanks you received back to actor 1. In case that actor 1 imposed a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks, 
and if you transfer back less than actor 1’s desired amount, the conditional cut is due.  
 
 
Payoffs  
 
Actor 1 receives: 10  shanks  –  transfer to actor 2  +  back-transfer from actor 2. 
 
You as Actor 2 receive: 10 shanks  +  3 × transfer from actor 1  –  back-transfer to actor 1  –  4 shanks  
 (in case that a conditional payoff cut has been imposed and is due)  
 
 
Exchange rate:  For every shank you earn you will be paid $2 (2 U.S. dollars). 
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Table 1: Comparison of Trust and Trust with Punishment Treatment 
   
Average (over all observations)  
Trust  Trust with Punishment 
Transfer (investment) 
x to the agent 
4.0 (2.6) 
5.9 (2.3) 
5.0 (2.9) 
7.3 (2.3) 
Desired payback in 
percent of tripled 
investment !/3x 
73.8 (42.5) 
65.1 (20.5) 
69.9 (24.0) 
66.1 (23.2) 
Actual payback in 
percent of tripled 
investment y/3x 
31.6 (26.3) 
44.1 (22.3) 
38.7 (33.6) 
44.0 (23.3) 
Principals’ payoff 
 
10.5 (3.0) 
11.8 (3.7) 
11.0 (4.9) 
12.6 (4.9) 
Agents’ payoff 17.5 (5.9) 
20.1 (5.6) 
17.4 (7.5) 
20.5 (5.1) 
Number of 
observations (pairs)  
126 (63 pairs) 
76 (38 pairs) 
126 (63 pairs) 
76 (38 pairs) 
 
• CEO data in bold. 
• Standard deviations in parentheses. 
• Figures are in shanks. 
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Table 2: Regression Estimatesa,b for the Agents’ Payback 
     
 
Model Type 
 Students   CEOs  
 
Variable OLS Random Effects OLS Random Effects 
 
Investment 0.80** 0.77** 1.13** 0.92**  
 (5.8) (5.9) (5.74) (4.65)  
 
TWP -0.26 -0.17 -1.79* -1.55**  
 (0.35) (0.26) (1.81) (2.06)  
 
TWPN 4.5** 4.2** 6.21** 6.33**  
 (3.5) (3.4) (4.78) (5.96)  
 
Constant 1.35* 1.5** 0.94 2.24*  
 (1.8) (2.0) (0.71) (1.70)  
 
Person NO YES NO YES 
Random Effects 
 
LM (df) --- 3.1(1) --- 8.0(1) 
 
R2  0.36 0.36 0.55 0.54  
 
n  126  126 76 76 
aDependent variable is the agent’s transfer back to the principal (in shanks). 
bt-ratios (in absolute value) are beneath coefficient estimates. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
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Table 3: Splitting up the Trust with Punishment Treatment 
 
Average (over all observations) 
Trust  Trust with Punishment 
 
 No Punishment Punishment 
Transfer (investment) 
x to the agent 
4.0 (2.6) 
5.9 (2.3) 
7.4 (1.7) 
8.5 (2.1) 
4.4 (2.8) 
6.5 (2.1) 
Desired payback in 
percent of tripled 
investment (!/3x) 
73.8 (42.5) 
65.1 (20.5) 
60.4 (22.3) 
66.8 (19.3) 
67.9 (22.9) 
65.6 (26.0) 
Actual payback in 
percent of tripled 
investment (y/3x) 
31.6 (26.3) 
44.1 (22.3) 
52.9 (22.1) 
61.4 (15.6) 
34.9 (35.2) 
32.7 (20.5) 
Principals’ payoff 10.5 (3.0) 
11.8 (3.7) 
14.1 (5.0) 
16.5 (2.7) 
10.2 (4.7) 
10.0 (4.3) 
Agents’ payoff 17.5 (5.9) 
20.1 (5.6) 
20.8 (6.2) 
20.4 (4.9) 
16.5 (7.6) 
20.6 (5.2) 
Number of 
observations (pairs) 
126 (63 pairs) 
76 (38 pairs) 
26 (13 pairs) 
30 (15 pairs) 
100 (50 pairs) 
46 (23 pairs) 
 
• CEO data in bold. 
• Standard deviations in parentheses. 
• Figures are in shanks. 
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Table 4: Efficiency 
 
 
 Average Efficiency 
Trust Game 70.0% (12.9) 
79.7% (11.4) 
Trust with punishment  70.9% (15.9) 
82.9% (13.4) 
Trust, no punishment used 87.3% (8.3) 
92.3% (10.7) 
Trust, punishment used 66.7% (14.7) 
76.6% (11.5) 
 
• Efficiency =  (principal’s payoff + agent’s payoff)/40 
• CEO data in bold. 
• Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Back-transfers of CEOs and Students in the Trust Treatment 
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Figure 2: Back-transfers of CEOs and Students in the Trust with Punishment 
Treatment 
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Figure 3: The Impact of the Punishment Threat on CEOs’ Back-transfers  
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Figure 4: The Impact of the Punishment Threat on Students’ Back-transfers 
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